# 2AC

#### The alternative triggers war.

**Doran 99** (Charles, Professor of International Relations at Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies, Survival, 1999, Summer, p. 148-9, proquest)

The conclusion, then, is that the probability of major war declines for some states, but increases for others. And it is very difficult to argue that it has disappeared in any significant or reliable or hopeful sense. Moreover, a problem with arguing a position that might be described as utopian is that such arguments have policy implications. It is worrying that as a thesis about the obsolescence of major war becomes more compelling to more people, including presumably governments, the tendency will be to forget about the underlying problem, which is not war per se, but security. And by neglecting the underlying problem of security, the probability of war perversely increases: as governments fail to provide the kind of defence and security necessary to maintain deterrence, one opens up the possibility of new challenges. In this regard it is worth recalling one of Clauswitz's most important insights: A conqueror is always a lover of peace. He would like to make his entry into our state unopposed. That is the underlying dilemma when one argues that a major war is not likely to occur and, as a consequence, one need not necessarily be so concerned about providing the defences that underlie security itself. History shows that surprise threats emerge and rapid destabilising efforts are made to try to provide that missing defence, and all of this contributes to the spiral of uncertainty that leads in the end to war.

#### Insecurity and disorder aren’t inevitable—careful future planning has been enormously effective. Debates amongst citizens are key to assessing probability and effectively planning.

Kurasawa, 04 (Professor of Sociology, York University of Toronto, Fuyuki, Constellations Volume 11, No 4, 2004).

Moreover, keeping in mind the sobering lessons of the past century cannot but make us wary about humankind’s supposedly unlimited ability for problemsolving or discovering solutions in time to avert calamities. In fact, the historical track-record of last-minute, technical ‘quick-fixes’ is hardly reassuring. What’s more, most of the serious perils that we face today (e.g., nuclear waste, climate change, global terrorism, genocide and civil war) demand complex, sustained, long-term strategies of planning, coordination, and execution. On the other hand, an examination of fatalism makes it readily apparent that the idea that humankind is doomed from the outset puts off any attempt to minimize risks for our successors, essentially condemning them to face cataclysms unprepared. An a priori pessimism is also unsustainable given the fact that long-term preventive action has had (and will continue to have) appreciable beneficial effects; the examples of medical research, the welfare state, international humanitarian law, as well as strict environmental regulations in some countries stand out among many others. The evaluative framework proposed above should not be restricted to the critique of misappropriations of farsightedness, since it can equally support public deliberation with a reconstructive intent, that is, democratic discussion and debate about a future that human beings would freely self-determine. Inverting Foucault’s Nietzschean metaphor, we can think of genealogies of the future that could perform a farsighted mapping out of the possible ways of organizing social life. They are, in other words, interventions into the present intended to facilitate global civil society’s participation in shaping the field of possibilities of what is to come. Once competing dystopian visions are filtered out on the basis of their analytical credibility, ethical commitments, and political underpinnings and consequences, groups and individuals can assess the remaining legitimate catastrophic scenarios through the lens of genealogical mappings of the future. Hence, our first duty consists in addressing the present-day causes of eventual perils, ensuring that the paths we decide upon do not contract the range of options available for our posterity.42 Just as importantly, the practice of genealogically inspired farsightedness nurtures the project of an autonomous future, one that is socially self-instituting. In so doing, we can acknowledge that the future is a human creation instead of the product of metaphysical and extra-social forces (god, nature, destiny, etc.), and begin to reflect upon and deliberate about the kind of legacy we want to leave for those who will follow us. Participants in global civil society can then take – and in many instances have already taken – a further step by committing themselves to socio-political struggles forging a world order that, aside from not jeopardizing human and environmental survival, is designed to rectify the sources of transnational injustice that will continue to inflict needless suffering upon future generations if left unchallenged.

**The economy cannot be securitized – there is no friend/enemy distinction in the economic sector**

**William 3** (Michael C., Chairholder in the Faculty Research Chair in International Politics, professor in the Graduate School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Ottawa “Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics”, *International Studies Quarterly*, [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x/full)//AMV](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/doi/10.1046/j.0020-8833.2003.00277.x/full)/AMV)

A second of McSweeny’s criticisms illustrates the point equally well. McSweeny argues that if an a priori, unified understanding of society as concerned with identity were set aside, and researchers went out and actually asked what individuals in society saw as their primary security concerns, they would find that questions of economic welfare rather than issues of social identity were preeminent (1999:72). While this is clearly to a degree an empirical question, and one undoubtedly likely to vary enormously in different contexts, it serves also to highlight the affinities of the Copenhagen School with Schmittian themes. From the perspective of securitization theory, economic well-being is not a ‘‘security’’ issue unless it is placed within the categories (and successful speech-acts) of existential threat. **The uncontested fact that economic deprivation is a severe threat to life does not mean that it is capable of being effectively cast as a security issue**. Only if this issue could be securitized (cast, as I have argued, in terms of friends and enemies) would it become so. For a variety of reasons (the abstractness of markets, and the individualized and intrinsically ‘‘risky’’ nature of capitalism among them), the Copenhagen School does not think that such a process is likely to succeed.25 This does not, to repeat, mean that economic factors are not crucial to human life and well-being, or that economic factors may not be crucial in fostering processes of securitization; but it does mean that unless dynamics of deprivation generate effective mobilization as threats, and thereby collective support for decisions of threat that are the hallmarks of securitization, **they remain distinct from issues of security.**26

**Changing discourse doesn’t eliminate security dilemmas**

**Copeland, 2000** (Dale, professor of government at University of Virginia, International Security 25:2, Fall 2000, ingenta)

Although the road ahead for Wendt’s neoconstructivism is still long, Social Theory of International Politics provides a solid constructivist vehicle for travel-ing it. The book allows scholars to differentiate clearly between truly material and ideational explanations, and between accounts that emphasize the role of states as actors and those that incorporate transnational forces and divisions within polities. It has reinforced the importance of diplomacy as a tool for re-ducing high levels of misunderstanding that can impede cooperation. Yet by bracketing off domestic processes, Wendt has overlooked the irony of constructivism: that the mutability of human ideational structures at the do-mestic level reinforces leaders’ great uncertainty about future intentions at the interstate level. The security dilemma, with all its implications, is real and per-vasive. It cannot be talked away through better discursive practices. It must be faced.

**Turn—rejecting strategic predictions of threats makes them inevitable—decision makers will rely on preconceived conceptions of threat rather than the more qualified predictions of analysts**

**Fitzsimmons, 2007** [Michael, Washington DC defense analyst, “The Problem of Uncertainty in Strategic Planning”, Survival, Winter 06-07, online]

But handling even this weaker form of uncertainty is still quite challeng- ing. If not sufficiently bounded, a high degree of variability in planning factors can exact a significant price on planning. The complexity presented by great variability strains the cognitive abilities of even the most sophisticated decision- makers.15 And even a robust decision-making process sensitive to cognitive limitations necessarily sacrifices depth of analysis for breadth as variability and complexity grows. It should follow, then, that in planning under conditions of risk, variability in strategic calculation should be carefully tailored to available analytic and decision processes. Why is this important? What harm can an imbalance between complexity and cognitive or analytic capacity in strategic planning bring? Stated simply, where analysis is silent or inadequate, the personal beliefs of decision-makers fill the void. As political scientist Richard Betts found in a study of strategic sur- prise, in ‘an environment that lacks clarity, abounds with conflicting data, and allows no time for rigorous assessment of sources and validity, ambiguity allows intuition or wishfulness to drive interpretation ... The greater the ambiguity, the greater the impact of preconceptions.’16 The decision-making environment that Betts describes here is one of political-military crisis, not long-term strategic planning. But a strategist who sees uncertainty as the central fact of his environ- ment brings upon himself some of the pathologies of crisis decision-making. He invites ambiguity, takes conflicting data for granted and substitutes a priori scepticism about the validity of prediction for time pressure as a rationale for discounting the importance of analytic rigour. It is important not to exaggerate the extent to which data and ‘rigorous assessment’ can illuminate strategic choices. Ambiguity is a fact of life, and scepticism of analysis is necessary. Accordingly, the intuition and judgement of decision-makers will always be vital to strategy, and attempting to subordinate those factors to some formulaic, deterministic decision-making model would be both undesirable and unrealistic. All the same, there is danger in the opposite extreme as well. Without careful analysis of what is relatively likely and what is relatively unlikely, what will be the possible bases for strategic choices? A decision-maker with no faith in prediction is left with little more than a set of worst-case scenarios and his existing beliefs about the world to confront the choices before him. Those beliefs may be more or less well founded, but if they are not made explicit and subject to analysis and debate regarding their application to particular strategic contexts, they remain only beliefs and premises, rather than rational judgements. Even at their best, such decisions are likely to be poorly understood by the organisations charged with their implementation. At their worst, such decisions may be poorly understood by the decision-makers themselves.

**Threats are real and our disaster discourse mobilizes people to deal with them**

**Kurasawa 4**

(Fuyuki Kurasawa, Associate Professor of Sociology at York University in Toronto, Canada, 2004, Constellations Vol 11, No 4, 2004, Cautionary Tales: The Global Culture of Prevention and the Work of Foresight <http://www.yorku.ca/kurasawa/Kurasawa%20Articles/Constellations%20Article.pdf>)

In addition**,** farsightedness has become a priority in world affairs due to the appearance of new global threats and the resurgence of ‘older’ ones. Virulent forms of ethno-racial nationalismand religious fundamentalismthat had mostly been kept in check or bottled up duringthe Cold War have reasserted themselves in ways that are now all-too-familiar – civil warfare, genocide, ‘ethnic cleansing,’ and global terrorism. And if nuclear mutually assured destruction has come to pass, other dangers are filling the vacuum: climate change, AIDS and other diseases (BSE, SARS, etc.), as well as previously unheralded genomic perils (genetically modified organisms, human cloning). Collective remembrance of past atrocities and disasters has galvanized some sectors of public opinion and made the international community’s unwillingness to adequately intervene before and during the genocides in the ex-Yugoslavia and Rwanda, or to take remedial steps in the case of the spiraling African and Asian AIDS pandemics, appear particularly glaring. Returning to the point I made at the beginning of this paper, the significance of foresight is a direct outcome of the transition toward a dystopian imaginary(or what Sontag has called “the imagination of disaster”).11 Huxley’s Brave New World and Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, two groundbreaking dystopiannovels of the first half of the twentieth century, remain as influential as ever in framing public discourse and understanding current techno-scientific dangers, while recent paradigmatic cultural artifacts – films like The Matrix and novels like Atwood’s Oryx and Crake – reflect and give shape to this catastrophic sensibility.12 And yet dystopianism need not imply despondency, paralysis, or fear. Quite the opposite, in fact, since the pervasiveness of a dystopian imaginary can help notions of historical contingency and fallibilism gain traction against their determinist and absolutist counterparts.13 Once we recognize that the future is uncertain and that any course of action produces both unintended and unexpected consequences, the responsibility to face up to potential disasters and intervene before they strike becomes compelling. From another angle, dystopianism lies at the core of politics in a global civil society where groups mobilize their ownnightmare scenarios (‘Frankenfoods’ and a lifeless planet for environmentalists, totalitarian patriarchy of the sort depicted in Atwood’s Handmaid’s Tale for Western feminism, McWorld and a global neoliberal oligarchy for the alternative globalization movement, etc.). Such scenarios can act as catalysts for public debate and socio-political action**,** spurring citizens’ involvement in the work of preventive foresight.

**CO2 emissions are past the tipping point.**

**Hillman 07** [Mayer Hill is a senior fellow at the Policy Studies Institute, The Suicidal Planet: How To Prevent Global Climate Catastrophe, p. 25-6]

The effects of climate change **cannot** quickly **be reversed by** reducing or **even eliminating future emissions** of greenhouse gases. There are two reasons for this. First, greenhouse gases released into the atmosphere linger for decades (in the case of relatively short-lived gases like methane), or hundreds of years (for carbon dioxide), or even thousands of years (for the long-lived gases like per-fluorocarbons). Carbon dioxide and methane concentrations in the atmosphere are respectively one-third and more than twice as high as those at any time over the last 650,000 years. Even if no additional carbon dioxide were emitted from now on, atmospheric concentrations would take centuries to decline to pre-Industrial Revolution levels. While elevated levels of greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere, additional warming will occur.

**Venezuelan economic instability causes oil shocks and spills over.**

**Noriega 11/26,** 2013, Roger, former assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, former US ambassador to the OAS, assistant secretary of state under President George W. Bush. He is an American Enterprise Institute visiting fellow and managing director of Vision Americas LLC, which represents US and foreign clients, “Venezuela headed for chaos,” http://nypost.com/2013/11/26/venezuela-headed-for-chaos/)//DR. H

The United States imports about half the Venezuelan petroleum that it did when Chávez was elected in 1998, but that’s still 9 percent of our foreign oil purchases. Plus, an implosion of Venezuela’s economy — or, God forbid, prolonged civil warfare — will roil the international oil markets and destabilize the region when the US economy is sputtering.

What’s worse, in the last decade, Venezuela has become a narco-state, with dozens of senior officials and state-run enterprises complicit in the lucrative cocaine trade. The regime also is an ally of Iran and Hezbollah, which may find their own ways to exploit chaos in Venezuela.

Geography makes the bloodbath in Syria all but invisible to Americans, but Venezuela is a three-hour flight from Miami and No. 3 in the world in social networking. The US public will see photos and videos of innocent demonstrators mowed down in the street. Moreover, in the Americas, the United States will be expected to lead.

**Those cause a nuclear war.**

**Qasem 7,** Islam Yasin  a doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and Social Sciences at the University of Pompeu Fabra (UPF) in Barcelona, MA in International Affairs from Columbia, July 9, 2007, “The Coming Warfare of Oil Shortage,” online: <http://www.opednews.com/articles/opedne_islam_ya_070709_the_coming_warfare_o.htm>

Recognizing the strategic value of oil for their national interests, **superpowers will** not hesitate to unleash their economic and **military power** to ensure secure access to oil resources, **triggering worldwide** tension, if not armed **conflict.** And while superpowers like the United States maintain superior conventional military power, in addition to their nuclear power, some weaker states are already nuclearly armed, others are seeking nuclear weapons. In an anarchic world with many nuclear-weapon states feeling insecure, and a global economy in downward spiral, the chances of **using nuclear weapons** in pursues of national interests **are high.**

**Latin American instability causes great power wars.**

**Grygiel 09** [Jakub, George H.W. Bush Assoc Prof, IR, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced Int’l Studies, Johns Hopkins U, “Vacuum Wars: The Coming Competition Over Failed States,” American Interest, Jul/Aug 2009, [http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=622]jap](http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=622%5djap)

The prevailing view of failed states is, to repeat, not wrong, just incomplete—for it ignores the competitive nature of great power interactions. The traditional understanding of power vacuums is still very relevant. Sudan, Central Asia, Indonesia, parts of Latin America and many other areas are characterized by weak and often collapsing states that are increasingly arenas for **great power competition.** The interest of these great powers is not to rebuild the state or to engage in “nation-building” for humanitarian purposes but **to establish a foothold in the region**, to obtain favorable economic deals, especially in the energy sector, **and** to **weaken** the presence of **other** great **powers.**  Let’s look at just three possible future scenarios. In the first, imagine that parts of Indonesia become increasingly difficult to govern and are wracked by riots. Chinese minorities are attacked, while pirates prowl sealanes in ever greater numbers. Bejing, pressured by domestic opinion to help the Chinese diaspora, as well as by fears that its seaborne commerce will be interrupted, intervenes in the region. China’s action is then perceived as a threat by Japan, which projects its own power into the region. The United States, India and others then intervene to protect their interests, as well. In the second scenario, imagine that Uzbekistan collapses after years of chronic mismanagement and continued Islamist agitation. Uzbekistan’s natural resources and its strategic value as a route to the Caspian or Middle East are suddenly up for grabs, and Russia and China begin to compete for control over it, possibly followed by other states like Iran and Turkey. In a third scenario, imagine that the repressive government of Sudan loses the ability to maintain control over the state, and that chaos spreads from Darfur outward to Chad and other neighbors. Powers distant and nearby decide to extend their control over the threatened oil fields. China, though still at least a decade away from having serious power projection capabilities, already has men on the ground in Sudan protecting some of the fields and uses them to control the country’s natural resources. These scenarios are not at all outlandish, as recent events have shown. Kosovo, which formally declared independence on February 17, 2008, continues to strain relationships between the United States and Europe, on the one hand, and Serbia and Russia, on the other. The resulting tension may degenerate into violence as Serbian nationalists and perhaps even the Serbian army intervene in Kosovo. It is conceivable then that Russia would support Belgrade, leading to a serious confrontation with the European Union and the United States. A similar conflict, pitting Russia against NATO or the United States alone, or some other alliance of European states, could develop in several post-Soviet regions, from Georgia to the Baltics. Last summer’s war in Georgia, for instance, showed incipient signs of a great power confrontation between Russia and the United States over the fate of a weak state, further destabilized by a rash local leadership and aggressive meddling by Moscow. The future of Ukraine may follow a parallel pattern: Russian citizens (or, to be precise, ethnic Russians who are given passports by Moscow) may claim to be harassed by Ukrainian authorities, who are weak and divided. A refugee problem could then arise, giving Moscow a ready justification to intervene militarily. The question would then be whether NATO, or the United States, or some alliance of Poland and other states would feel the need and have the ability to prevent Ukraine from falling under Russian control. Another example could arise in Iraq. If the United States fails to stabilize the situation and withdraws, or even merely scales down its military presence too quickly, one outcome could be the collapse of the central government in Baghdad. The resulting vacuum would be filled by militias and other groups, who would engage in violent conflict for oil, political control and sectarian revenge. This tragic situation would be compounded if Iran and Saudi Arabia, the two regional powers with the most direct interests in the outcome, entered the fray more directly than they have so far. In sum, there are many more plausible scenarios in which a failed state could become a playground of both regional and great power rivalry, which is why we urgently need to dust off the traditional view of failed states and consider its main features as well as its array of consequences. The traditional view starts from a widely shared assumption that, as nature abhors vacuums, so does the international system. As Richard Nixon once said to Mao Zedong, “In international relations there are no good choices. One thing is sure—we can leave no vacuums, because they can be filled.”6 The power vacuums created by failed states attract the interests of great powers because they are an easy way to expand their spheres of influence while weakening their opponents or forestalling their intervention. A state that decides not to fill a power vacuum is effectively inviting other states to do so, thereby potentially decreasing its own relative power. This simple, inescapable logic is based on the view that international relations are essentially a zero-sum game: My gain is your loss. A failed state creates a dramatic opportunity to gain something, whether natural resources, territory or a strategically pivotal location. The power that controls it first necessarily increases its own standing relative to other states. As Walter Lippmann wrote in 1915, the **anarchy of the world** is due to the backwardness of weak states; . . . the modern nations have lived in armed peace and collapsed into hideous warfare because in Asia, Africa, the Balkans, Central and South America there are rich territories in which weakness invites exploitation, in which inefficiency and corruption invite imperial expansion, in which the prizes are so great that the competition for them is to the knife.7 The threat posed by failed states, therefore, need not emanate mainly from within. After all, by definition a failed state is no longer an actor capable of conducting a foreign policy. It is a politically inert geographic area whose fate is dependent on the actions of others. The main menace to international security stems from competition between these “others.” As Arnold Wolfers put it in 1951, because of the competitive nature of international relations, “expansion would be sure to take place wherever a power vacuum existed.”8 The challenge is that the incentive to extend control over a vacuum or a failed state is similar for many states. In fact, even if one state has a stronger desire to control a power vacuum because of its geographic proximity, natural resources or strategic location, this very interest spurs other states to seek command over the same territory simply because doing so weakens that state. The ability to deprive a state of something that will give it a substantial advantage is itself a source of power. Hence a failed state suddenly becomes a strategic prize, because it either adds to one’s own power or subtracts from another’s. The prevailing and traditional views of failed states reflect two separate realities. Therefore, we should not restrict ourselves to one view or the other when studying our options. The difference is not just academic; it has very practical consequences. First and foremost, if we take the traditional view, failed states may pose an even greater danger to international security than policymakers and academics currently predict. Humanitarian disasters are certainly tragedies that deserve serious attention; yet they do not pose the worst threats to U.S. security or world stability. That honor still belongs to the possibility of a great power confrontation. While the past decade or so has allowed us to ignore great power rivalries as the main feature of international relations, there is no guarantee that this happy circumstance will continue long into the future. Second, there is no one-size-fits-all policy option for a given failed state. Humanitarian disasters carry a set of policy prescriptions that are liable to be counterproductive in an arena of great power conflict. It is almost a truism that failed states require multilateral cooperation, given their global impact. But the traditional view of failed states leads us not to seek multilateral settings but to act **preemptively** and often unilaterally. Indeed, it is often safer to seek to extend one’s control over failed states quickly in order to limit the possibility of intervention by other great powers.

#### Venezuela’s key -- weak domestic institutions multiply the effect on the ICSID.

**Lee and Johnson 12**—Chia-yi Lee, Noel P. Johnson is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis and a graduate associate at the Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy at Washington University (“Improving Reputation BIT by BIT: Bilateral Investment Treaties, Domestic Institutions, and Foreign Accountability”, http://npjohnston.wustl.edu/Research\_files/MPSApaper\_BIT,%207.11.12.pdf) EL

In the literature on foreign direct investment (FDI), both domestic institutions and international institutions are found to be important determinants of inward FDI. How international institutions and domestic institutions interact to affect FDI in- ﬂows, however, is understudied; how international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) help attract FDI is also unclear. This paper argues that the effect of BITs on FDI is contingent on the quality of domestic institutions. While countries having strong institutional quality are more attractive to foreign investors, they may not make signiﬁcant gains by signing BITs since their reputation is already good in foreign investors’ eyes. Moreover, BITs can alter private investors’ assessment on a country by providing extra information, particularly about the involvement of another inﬂuential country, but they may not lead to a genuine improvement on institutional quality. The empirical analysis shows that the effect of BITs is only positive and statistically signiﬁcant for countries having weak domestic institutions. It also suggests that BITs can enhance the economic ratings of the signatory countries, but may not signiﬁcantly alter domestic institutions for property rights protection. Recent decades have witnessed the increasingly important role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the global economy. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), in 2010, the total amount of FDI inﬂows in the world (in nominal terms) reached 1,243 billion dollars, almost 100 times that in 1970 (13 billion dollars).1 With inward FDI now considered to be conducive to the economic growth and development of recipient countries, many developing countries carry out reforms in order to attract foreign capital. Exploring the determinants of FDI has hence become a popular topic in the economic and political science literature. A dominant ﬁnding in FDI studies is that both the economic and political conditions of a host country inﬂuence how foreign investors assess their investment decision. For many investors, stable, low-risk environments are more conducive to proﬁt maximization. To attract these investors, many governments seek to improve the quality of domestic institutions, such as strengthening property rights protection. Domestic institutions, however, are difﬁcult to change dramatically, and more and more countries are relying on international institutions such as bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to allure foreign capital. While most studies indicate that BITs have the ability to attract FDI, few consider the interaction between domestic institutions and BITs. This paper argues that the impact of BITs on FDI is not independent of, but conditional on the role of domestic institutions. In speciﬁc, we argue that the ability of BITs to attract FDI is stronger in countries with weaker domestic institutions. The theory suggests that, in practice, these beneﬁts are realizable not because BITs radically alter domestic institutions for property rights protection, but because additional accountability (to foreign governments) changes the incentive structure of the host country. In consequence, we argue that BITs have the ability to change investor perceptions without imposing a need for the host country to genuinely enhance institutional quality. Likewise, countries with strong domestic institutions may gain little (in FDI inﬂows) by signing BITs since they have less need to improve their domestic environments. To test our hypotheses, we examine the conditional effect of BITs on inward FDI and the direct effects of BITs on domestic institutions and on market actors’ evaluations. The results show that BITs signiﬁcantly increase FDI inﬂows, but only in countries with weak property rights protection or with low executive constraints, supporting the idea that domestic institutions condition the ability of BITs to attract FDI. The results also show that BITs lead to higher investor appraisals of a host country, but do not impact its domestic institutions for property rights protection. The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews existing literature on FDI and BITs and explains how accountability to another nation can function as a place holder for genuine institutional improvements at home. Section 3 uses this logic to hypothesize which countries will be more likely to beneﬁt from BITs and how BITs affect the broader institutional landscape of property rights and government constraints in a host country. Section 4 describes the data and statistical model used to test our hypotheses, and section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes.

**Appeasement now.**

Investor News 11/21, 2013, “Obamalateral Disarmament — U.S. To Cut ICBM Squadron,” http://news.investors.com/ibd-editorials/112113-680264-obama-planning-to-close-icbm-squadron.htm)//DR. H

Defense: Breaking yet another promise, this one to Congress, the administration jeopardizes our national security with plans to eliminate an entire squadron of intercontinental ballistic missiles and destroy its silos.

Yet another example of what President Obama meant in 2012 when he promised Russian President Dmitry Medvedev at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul, South Korea, that after his re-election he would have more "flexibility" on defense issues, comes on the news that an ICBM squadron would be scrapped to comply with the New START Treaty — even as both the Russians and Chinese deploy new ballistic missiles.

A document prepared by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and obtained by the Washington Free Beacon maps out a strategy to eliminate an ICBM squadron — and destroy its missile silos — by Dec. 5, 2017.

The military would begin removing ICBMs next October, after an environmental assessment is complete, and the silo elimination would begin in May 2016.

The fact is, as the Heritage Foundation notes, the U.S. does not need to eliminate an ICBM squadron to meet New START's limits. The State Department's Oct. 1 fact sheet says the U.S. must dismantle 109 of its deployed ICBMs, deployed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and deployed heavy bombers, and remove another 138 warheads.

Heritage notes the U.S. has already reduced its deployed warheads by 112 and that destroying an ICBM squadron to comply with New START is unnecessary.

Further cuts, if needed, could be made by removing the missiles and placing the silos in reserve status.

The document says the reductions are necessary to "meet the New START Treaty compliance date by closing an ICBM squadron and eliminating the associated Launch Facilities." But that's not true. New START does not require destruction of the silos.

So why the unnecessary move to cut our offensive missile deterrent force after the administration has scrapped Phase IV of our European-based missile defense, which was the proposed replacement for the ground-based interceptors and missile radars that were scuttled in a betrayal of our Polish and Czech allies?

The president has said he dreams of a world without nuclear weapons, which critics point out seems to mean only a world without U.S. nukes.

He sees U.S. military supremacy as an anachronistic example of the American exceptionalism for which he has apologized so many times.

To that end, in his June 2013 Berlin speech, President Obama spoke of his desire to unilaterally reduce deployed U.S. nuclear forces by up to one-third.

**Plan’s key to Obama cred.**

**Boudin 9** (Chesa, Rhodes Scholar with degrees from Yale and Oxford Universities. Currently attending Yale Law School, he is coauthor of The Venezuelan Revolution: 100 Questions—100 Answers and coeditor of Letters from Young Activists, Why Obama Should Meet With Hugo Chavez, <http://upsidedownworld.org/main/venezuela-archives-35/1671-why-obama-should-meet-with-hugo-chavez>, 1/18/9)

Finally, there is a fourth point that should appeal to Chávez's harshest critics. A bilateral meeting would be the most significant thing a US President could do to temper his power. Chávez, like his friend Fidel Castro before him, benefits from the specter of a hostile US. Rhetoric about US imperialism and interventionism appeals to Venezuelans' pride in their sovereignty, and unifies Chávez's base against a perceived enemy; it also distracts them from real problems in their country and political process. The Bush Administration's disgraceful complicity with the plot to overthrow Chávez's democratic government in 2002, and its subsequent funneling of money and political support to an isolated, fragmented opposition in Venezuela played right into Chávez's hands. If Obama demonstrated that the US government is not Venezuela's enemy, he would accomplish **far more** than the millions of dollars the Bush Administration has invested in destabilizing Venezuela's government. Venezuela, like all democracies, benefits from free and open public debate but the political process is derailed, civil society distracted by the threat—real or exaggerated—of US intervention. Obama has the political capital and the credibility to singlehandedly restore the world's faith in the goodwill of the US; **Venezuela is a perfect place to start**. To be sure, an Obama offer to meet with Chávez, a twice-elected president widely portrayed in the US as undemocratic and anti-American, carries certain risks and the right-wing is bound to attack Obama for his efforts. But one of Obama's gifts as a politician is taking the high road, even in the face of counterparts who refuse to do the same; here, too, whether with Chávez's fiery rhetoric or the right-wing media's assault, **he would surely come out on top**. Moreover Chávez has already indicated a desire to work with Obama, issuing a congratulatory press release after the election, extraditing two Colombian drug traffickers to the US days later, and now continuing a generous charity program even as Venezuela suffers from the global economic slowdown. All are signs reminiscent of the Chávez of Mets games and stock market gavels: he wants to play ball. Conservatives may see Obama offering to meet with Chávez as a sign of weakness but it should be perceived as a sign of confidence and strength just as when President Nixon visited China in 1972, or when President Reagan met with Gorbachev in 1985 in the midst of the Cold War. In fact, numerous American politicians from both parties have met with Chávez over the years, often with tangible results; the Citgo charity program that last week Chávez announced he would continue, for example, emerged from meetings with Representative Delahunt (D-MA) and other congressmen.

**Credibility’s irrelevant.**

**Fettweis 08** – Professor of political science at Tulane (Christopher, “Credibility and the War on Terror,” Winter 2008, Political Science Quarterly)//Bwang

\*Sociology and Evidence proves.

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

**Plan solves Indo-Pak war.**

**Goel and Goel 8/31**-- Ashish Goel is an LLM candidate at King’s College London. Harish Goel is pursuing business and finance at Xavier Labour Relations Institute, Jamshedpur, India (2013, “India–US bilateral investment treaty going nowhere”, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/08/31/india-us-bilateral-investment-treaty-going-nowhere/>) EL

The India–US bilateral investment treaty negotiations have taken a hit after India insisted on preconditions that will, if implemented, deny foreign investors the right to international dispute settlement measures. India and the United States have engaged in bilateral investment treaty negotiations to enhance trade relations and investment flows since 2008. The treaty — which aims to protect and promote investments and guarantee international minimum standards in the treatment of foreign investments — could have further solidified the India–US trade relationship. But this seems highly unlikely now in light of a controversial procedural precondition set by India that would allow Indian courts to have the final say on commercial disputes that arise under the bilateral investment treaty. The proposed preconditions will harm India’s already fragile investment climate. Foreign investments have dropped dramatically in the last few years, mostly because of the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance’s unfavourable investment climate brought on by uncertain regulatory measures and retrospective changes to India’s taxation regime. In an attempt to improve India’s investment conditions, the government further liberalised its foreign direct investment policy for multi-brand retail, telecommunications and defence. The new tax and regulatory measures, however, failed to achieve the intended results. Rather than drawing in more foreign direct investment, multinationals began to opt out from the Indian market, preferring to invest in neighbouring countries with regulatory climates that offer higher returns, such as Japan and Pakistan. That steel giants Posco and ArcelorMittal announced they would pull out of their projects in India is a testament to the government’s failure in inviting and retaining foreign investors. Meanwhile, Indian investments in the United States have risen from US$200 million to US$5 billion between 2000 and 2010, and further rose to US$11 billion in 2012. This led to a mentionable growth in the US economy and created more than 100,000 jobs. Similar results were likely to appear in India had the government taken swift, proactive steps to facilitate foreign investments and provide Indian investors with incentives to invest in domestic projects. Countries concluding investment treaties almost always negotiate a dispute settlement provision. This generally includes conditional or unconditional consent to international arbitration, usually at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). An international arbitration clause in a bilateral investment treaty has two direct advantages. First, it ensures that investment disputes, which are far more technical than everyday commercial disputes, are adjudicated by qualified, specialist tribunals. The second advantage, which is in the form of procedural fairness, is that foreign investors are not forced to arbitrate disputes at a domestic level and comply with prolonged decision-making in the host country. India has proposed against an international dispute settlement clause during the latest round of negotiations. If the proposed conditions are accepted, US investors in India will be unable to pursue disputes relating to their investments under the treaty at a more specialised, independent forum such as the ICSID — Indian courts will have the final say on any dispute that arises under the treaty. This condition will also affect the Indian judiciary, which is eternally overburdened and lacks modern case management systems. A typical investment treaty also has a most favoured nation clause, but, given India’s stance on international dispute settlement in particular and treaty shopping in general, the India–US bilateral investment treaty is unlikely to have such a clause. This means that US investors will be unable to benefit from favourable dispute settlement provisions from the bilateral treaties India has signed with other countries. In order to get the most out of bilateral investment treaties, countries gladly provide effective measures for foreign investors to assert their claims and enforce their rights. Substantive provisions, such as those that provide for international minimum standards or fair and equitable treatment, are not ordinary and, indeed, require even extraordinary procedure to realise their overriding objective: that is, to safeguard the interests of foreign investors against the subjective, if not biased, opinion of domestic courts in favour of the local government. India’s concern about foreign adjudication, however legitimate, could have easily been addressed by incorporating a clause that would have obliged US investors to exhaust domestic remedies in Indian courts before pursuing it internationally. Rather than taking positive steps in addressing the excessive red tape and tax and regulatory uncertainties that are afflicting India’s investment climate, India has proposed a fresh procedural hurdle. Clearly, the government has not learnt enough from the Posco and ArcelorMittal fiasco.

#### Budget deal.

**UPI, 12/1**/13(“Immigration reform to play second-fiddle to budget this winter”

Read more: <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2013/12/01/Immigration-reform-to-play-second-fiddle-to-budget-this-winter/UPI-73801385923737/#ixzz2miHoBDOk>)

A Republican U.S. congressman said Sunday that movement on immigration reform is unlikely this winter until a new budget is passed.

Rep. Tom Cole, R-Okla., said on ABC's "This Week" that the budget was the top priority issue on Capitol Hill and immigration reform was on the back burner for now.

"Not until we get a budget done," Cole said. "Literally I think the most important thing right now is to make sure we don't have a government shutdown, to make sure that we deal with the debt ceiling."

Cole said a shutdown was unlikely at this point, but he acknowledged a spending plan will require a long process.

"Around here, we can't walk and chew gum," said Cole. "Let's just chew gum for a little while. And right now, chewing gum is getting a budget deal and making sure that we don't default when the debt ceiling comes around."

#### GOP divisions.

**Mascaro, 11/29**/13(Lisa, Los Angeles Times, “GOP promise of immigration reform fades a year after election”

<http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-gop-20131130,0,3679179.story#ixzz2miIKGPQE>)

Changing the way the party talks about immigration is about all House Republicans have to show for their efforts over the last 11 months — and even that effort has notable exceptions.

Though Speaker John A. Boehner of Ohio has insisted recently that immigration reform is not dead, the House is about to finish the year without progress on a topic that is a priority to Latino voters, an electorate the GOP desperately needs to woo before the next presidential race.

In fact, the House's most visible immigration-related action was a measure to defund an Obama administration program to defer deportations of young immigrants, a vote that increased Latino animosity even though it failed to become law.

The legislative sputter stems from Republicans' focus on the 2014 midterm election. As lawmakers burnish their conservative credentials for potential hard-right primary challenges, they are betting they will have time to court Latinos before the 2016 election.

But the inaction raises questions about whether Republicans have learned from their electoral losses last year and can broaden the party's base to appeal to more minorities. And it's not only immigration reform. GOP promises to be more inclusive to women and gays also have produced few results.

"It's foolhardy," said Alex Nowrasteh, a policy analyst at the libertarian-leaning Cato Institute. "On the one hand, Republicans have improved their rhetoric and they've moved much more toward embracing immigration reform. On the other hand, immigration reform was passed in the Senate and was dropped in the House of Representatives, and that makes them look like they're opposed to reform, which in a way, they are."

In last year's presidential election, Mitt Romney — whose comment about "self-deportation" infuriated immigration advocates — lost the Latino vote by a 44-percentage-point margin, the largest deficit of any Republican presidential candidate since the Clinton era. Alarmed GOP insiders jump-started congressional talks toward a bipartisan immigration overhaul, and Boehner announced the time had come for Congress to act.

But the speaker has refused to take up the Senate's sweeping bipartisan overhaul of immigration laws, even though it would probably pass the House with Democratic support; nor are House Republicans expected to vote on their own measures any time soon.

Divisions within the House GOP have left the party at a standstill. More Republican lawmakers than ever — nearly two dozen, by some counts — support the cornerstone of an immigration overhaul, which is a path to citizenship for immigrants in the U.S. illegally.

But many more oppose legalization efforts. Most House Republicans represent conservative districts, configured to include few minority voters. The handful of exceptions, including several from California, have already come under pressure in their districts, but most have little interest in the subject.

"There's just no cohesion there yet," said Sen. John McCain (R-Ariz.), who has tried to persuade Republicans to take action. "All I hope is that they realize that the issue is not going away — that we need to act on it — that we'd be glad to consider any proposals or ideas they have."

Hedging the political risks, House GOP leaders continue working behind the scenes with lawmakers to draft a series of bills that could be brought forward next year.

Together, they would resemble the main ingredients of the comprehensive Senate bill.

One, from Majority Leader Eric Cantor of Virginia, would provide a path to citizenship for young people brought to the U.S. illegally as minors. Another would allow adult immigrants to apply for legal status as border security is ramped up.

President Obama has extended a hand to Boehner several times by saying he would be open to the House GOP's piecemeal approach rather than the Senate's big package.

"It's Thanksgiving; we can carve that bird into multiple pieces," Obama said during a speech in San Francisco on Monday. "A drumstick here, breast meat there. But as long as all the pieces get done — soon — and we actually deliver on the core values we've been talking about for so long, I think everybody is fine with it."

House Republicans, though, have resisted most White House initiatives. Many Republicans prefer to use the months ahead investigating what went wrong with the healthcare law. And some House members seem to have missed the memo on new talking points.

**Nuke deterrence fails.**

**Wilson 1/13**/13 -senior fellow at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (1/13/2013, “The Myth of Nuclear Necessity,” http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/14/opinion/the-myth-of-nuclear-necessity.html?pagewanted=all)JCP

There is also a small group of people who still believe fervently in nuclear weapons. President Obama had to buy passage of the New START treaty with Russia, in 2010, with a promise to spend $185 billion to modernize warheads and delivery systems over 10 years — revealing that while support for nuclear weapons may not be broad, it runs deep. **That support endures because of** five widely held myths. The first is the myth that nuclear weapons altered the course of World War II. Leaving aside the morality of America’s decision to drop atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, new research by the historian Tsuyoshi Hasegawa and other scholars shows that Japan surrendered not because of the atom bomb but because the Soviets renounced neutrality and joined the war. Sixty-six Japanese cities had already been destroyed by conventional weapons — two more did not make the difference. **Attributing surrender to the bomb was** also **convenient for Japan’s leaders,** allowing them to blame defeat on a “miracle” weapon. **Second is the myth** of “decisive destruction.” **Mass destruction doesn’t win wars; killing soldiers does**. No war has ever been won simply by killing civilians. The 1941-44 siege of Leningrad didn’t deter Soviet leaders from pressing the fight against Hitler. Nor did the 1945 firebombing of Dresden force Germany to submit. As long as an army has a fighting chance at victory, wars continue. Building ever more destructive weapons simply increases the horror of war, not the certainty of ending it. **Third is the myth of reliable** nuclear deterrence. Numerous leaders have taken risks and acted aggressively during nuclear crises. In 1962, President John F. Kennedy and his advisers knew that blockading Cuba risked nuclear war; they mentioned the possibility 60 times while debating their options. Yet they went ahead. Nuclear proponents might argue that no cold war crisis ever erupted into nuclear war, so deterrence must work. But they’re moving the goal posts. Originally it was claimed that nuclear weapons would assure success in negotiations, prevent any sort of attack — conventional or nuclear — and allow countries to protect their friends with a nuclear umbrella. When the Russians weren’t intimidated during talks after World War II, the claim about negotiations was dropped. When the Yom Kippur War and the Falkland Islands War showed that fighting against nuclear-armed countries was possible, the prevention of conventional war claim was dropped. The nuclear umbrella claim ought to have been dropped at the same time, but there was too much American foreign policy riding on it for anyone to make this argument. After all, if Britain couldn’t deter an attack on its own far-flung islands, how could deterrence prevent attacks on other countries? **Fourth is the myth of the** long peace: the argument that the absence of nuclear war since 1945 means nuclear weapons have “kept the peace.” **But we don’t accept proof by absence in any circumstance where there is real risk**. We wouldn’t fly an airline that claimed to have invented a device that prevented metal fatigue, proved it by equipping 100 planes with the devices for one year without a single crash, and then suddenly ceased all metal-fatigue inspections and repairs, and decided instead to rely solely on these new devices. **The last and most stubborn myth is that of** irreversibility. Whenever idealists say that they want to abolish nuclear weapons, so-called realists shake their heads and say, in tones of patient condescension, “You can’t stuff the nuclear genie back in the bottle.” This is a specious **argument. It’s true that no technology is ever disinvented, but technology does fall out of use all the time.** (If you don’t believe me, try to get tech support on any electronic device more than three years old.) Devices disappear either because they are displaced by better technology or because they simply weren’t good. The question isn’t whether nuclear weapons can be disinvented, but whether they are useful. And their usefulness is questionable, given that no one has found an occasion to use them in over 67 years. **NOT everyone wants nuclear weapons**. What most people don’t realize is that **12 countries have either abandoned nuclear programs, dismantled existing weapons**, as South Africa did in the early 1990s, **or handed them over**, as Kazakhstan did after the 1991 breakup of the Soviet Union. **By contrast, only nine have nukes today** (the United States, Russia, Britain, France, China, India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea). It’s often assumed that Israel would be the last nation to give up nuclear weapons, given its history and a deep sense of responsibility to protect the Jewish people after the horrors of the Holocaust. But Israel has a powerful conventional military, is allied with the strongest country in the world and its leaders have a keen appreciation of military realities. They understand that nukes pose a greater danger to small countries than large ones. Twenty nuclear weapons used on Israel would do far more overlapping damage than 20 used on Iran. **Small nations have always been vulnerable. In a world without nuclear weapons they would preserve themselves as they always have: by forming alliances with the powerful and avoiding antagonizing neighbors**. France, not Israel, would most likely be the last country to give up nuclear weapons, which help preserve its image as a world power. In a nuclear-free world, France would just be another middle-size power with great cuisine. The real value of nuclear bombs is as status symbols, not as practical weapons. America and other nuclear powers must pursue the gradual abolition of nuclear weapons, but it will not be easy. Many leaders have little interest in giving up power, real or perceived. Any agreement would have to include stringent inspections and extensive safeguards. It would have to include all current nuclear-armed states in a complicated diplomatic process. But bans on other dangerous but clumsy armaments, like chemical and biological weapons, have been negotiated in the past. These bans — like laws — are sometimes broken. But the world is far safer with the bans than it would be without them. As Reagan knew, nuclear weapons make the world more dangerous, not less. Imagine arming a bank guard with dynamite and a lighter and you get a good idea of nuclear weapons’ utility: powerful, but too clumsy to use. Nuclear weapons were born out of fear, nurtured in fear and sustained by fear. They are dinosaurs — an evolutionary dead end. The trend in warfare today is toward smaller, smarter, more effective precision-guided weapons. Nuclear weapons — extremely dangerous and not very useful — are the wave of the past.

**Either Venezuelan engagement’s popular --**

**Spetalnick ‘13**

Matt Spetalnick – White House correspondent who has covered news on four continents for Reuters, from Latin American coups and drug wars – Reuter’s – March 6th, 2013 – “Despite new hopes, U.S. treads cautiously after death of Venezuela's Chavez” – http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/03/06/uk-venezuela-chavez-usa-idUKBRE92504920130306

Washington's challenge will be to figure out how far to go in seizing the opening to engage with Venezuelan leaders as well as its political opposition without giving the impression of U.S. meddling following the socialist president's death after a two-year battle with cancer. "We're not interested in having a confrontational relationship with Venezuela," a senior U.S. official told Reuters. "We're going to have to see how things evolve. It's a dynamic period." For Washington, a major test will be whether Venezuela follows its own constitution - which has been widely interpreted to require a special election to pick Chavez's successor - and if such a vote is conducted in a free and fair way in "accordance with hemispheric norms," the official said. Washington had accused Chavez and his allies of electoral abuses, such as intimidating foes and misusing state media during his 14-year rule. Chavez had created headaches for successive U.S. administrations with his strong anti-American rhetoric and his alliances with some of Washington's main foes, including Cuba and Iran. The question now is whether his leftist "revolution" and incendiary foreign policy can live on without his dominant personality at the helm. In a normally divided Washington, Chavez's death brought a rare moment of bipartisan agreement, with Republicans and Democrats alike seeing it as a chance to turn a page after a long period of strained U.S.-Venezuelan ties.

**Or the plan destroys the GOP -- that's key to Obama’s agenda.**

**Dickerson 13** (John, Slate, Go for the Throat!, www.slate.com/articles/news\_and\_politics/politics/2013/01/barack\_obama\_s\_second\_inaugural\_address\_the\_president\_should\_declare\_war.single.html)

On Monday, President Obama will preside over the grand reopening of his administration. It would be altogether fitting if he stepped to the microphone, looked down the mall, and let out a sigh: so many people expecting so much from a government that appears capable of so little. A second inaugural suggests new beginnings, but this one is being bookended by dead-end debates. Gridlock over the fiscal cliff preceded it and gridlock over the debt limit, sequester, and budget will follow. After the election, the same people are in power in all the branches of government and they don't get along. There's no indication that the president's clashes with House Republicans will end soon. Inaugural speeches are supposed to be huge and stirring. Presidents haul our heroes onstage, from George Washington to Martin Luther King Jr. George W. Bush brought the Liberty Bell. They use history to make greatness and achievements seem like something you can just take down from the shelf. Americans are not stuck in the rut of the day. But this might be too much for Obama’s second inaugural address: After the last four years, how do you call the nation and its elected representatives to common action while standing on the steps of a building where collective action goes to die? That bipartisan bag of tricks has been tried and it didn’t work. People don’t believe it. Congress' approval rating is 14 percent, the lowest in history. In a December Gallup poll, 77 percent of those asked said the way Washington works is doing “serious harm” to the country. **The challenge for** President **Obama’s** speech is the challenge of his **second term:** **how to be great when the environment stinks**. Enhancing the president’s legacy requires something more than simply the clever application of predictable stratagems. Washington’s partisan rancor, the size of the problems facing government, and the limited amount of time before Obama is a lame duck all point to a single conclusion: **The president** who came into office speaking in lofty terms about bipartisanship and cooperation **can only cement** his **legacy** **if he destroys the GOP**. If he wants to transform American politics, he must go for the throat. President Obama could, of course, resign himself to tending to the achievements of his first term. He'd make sure health care reform is implemented, nurse the economy back to health, and put the military on a new footing after two wars. But he's more ambitious than that. He ran for president as a one-term senator with no executive experience. In his first term, he pushed for the biggest overhaul of health care possible because, as he told his aides, he wanted to make history. He may already have made it. There's no question that he is already a president of consequence. But there's no sign he's content to ride out the second half of the game in the Barcalounger. He is approaching gun control, climate change, and immigration with wide and excited eyes. He's not going for caretaker. How should the president proceed then, if he wants to be bold? The Barack **Obama** of the first administration **might have approached the task by** **finding** some **Republicans to deal with** and then start agreeing to some of their demands in hope that he would win some of their votes. It's the traditional approach. Perhaps he could add a good deal more schmoozing with lawmakers, too. **That's the old way. He** has **abandoned that.** He doesn't think it will work and he doesn't have the time. As Obama explained in his last press conference, he thinks the **Republicans are dead set on opposing him**. **They cannot be unchained by schmoozing**. Even if Obama were wrong about Republican intransigence, other **constraints** will **limit** the chance for **cooperation**. Republican lawmakers worried about primary challenges in 2014 are not going to be willing partners. He probably has at most 18 months before people start dropping the lame-duck label in close proximity to his name. Obama’s only remaining option is to pulverize. Whether he succeeds in passing legislation or not, given his ambitions, his goal should be to delegitimize his opponents. **Through** a series of clarifying **fights over controversial issues, he can force Republicans to** either side with their coalition's most extreme elements or **cause a rift in the party that will leave it**, at least temporarily, **in disarray.**

# 1AR

**Their ev is just rhetoric -- pragmatism outweighs.**

**Parraguez, et al 10/12** – Luisa Parraguez is a professor and researcher at the Global Studies Department of Tecnológico de Monterrey’s Mexico City Campus, Francisco Garcia Gonzalez is a Tecnológico de Monterrey graduate and research coordinator at Mexico’s Auditoría Superior de la Federación. Joskua Tadeo is an international relations student and research assistant at Tecnológico de Monterrey’s Mexico City Campus (2013, “Latin America: Anti-US in Words, Not Deeds”, http://www.theepochtimes.com/n3/316260-latin-america-anti-us-in-words-not-deeds/) EL

MEXICO CITY—The Latin American blogosphere held its breath when Bolivian President Evo Morales’s plane was forced to land in Vienna in July. As European authorities searched for former U.S. National Security Agency contract worker Edward Snowden on board, Twitter accounts of South American presidents exploded with resentment. The continent denounced the United States for extending its hemispheric supremacy to Europe, sputtered words like “colonialism” and “imperialism,” and claimed that the incident violated the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Argentina’s President Cristina Kirchner called the incident “not only humiliating to a sister nation, but also for the whole South American continent.” Fury continues with reports that the NSA allegedly hacked Web accounts of Brazil’s state-owned oil company—described as “industrial espionage” by President Dilma Rousseff—and monitored Internet and phone communications of Rousseff and Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto while he was a candidate. Rousseff postponed a state visit to Washington, pending investigation, and with President Barack Obama waiting in the wings of the U.N. General Assembly for his turn at the podium, she tore into the United States for its “breach of international law.” This may be a turning point in U.S. relations with its southern neighbors. While anti-American sentiment on the street, a result of a long history of domination, is real, the bedrock reality is that the United States and Latin America are joined at the hip, economically and demographically. Trade, investment and immigration data reveal growing relations and interdependence. Turbulent History Rousseff’s suspending her trip to Washington is only the latest episode in a long history of turbulent relations with external powers. Simón Bolivar, the “Liberator of the South,” first proposed combatting European colonialism in South America in 1826. During the Cold War, the U.S. policy of containment led to military interventions in Central America and the Caribbean, and supported right-wing dictatorships in the Southern Cone. According to Amnesty International, hundreds of thousands were tortured, exiled, or “disappeared” by U.S.-backed military juntas in Chile, Argentina, and Guatemala. The U.S. fear of communism spreading in the region was controlled through the Organization of American States. After the 9/11 attacks in New York and Washington, the Multidimensional Secretariat was established at the OAS to deal with transnational threats such as terrorism and organized crime. Hundreds of thousands more have lost their lives in Colombia, Mexico, and Honduras with the rise of organized crime in the region. Until his death in March 2013, President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela spearheaded a group of eight nations under the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas, ALBA, in an anti-imperialist movement that carries the banner of 21st century socialism. ALBA, led by Cuba and Venezuela against the Free Trade Area of the Americas headed by the United States, was born to counteract U.S. dominion in the region. Soon after the NSA revelations began, left-wing governments in South America—Bolivia, Nicaragua, and Venezuela—made international headlines by offering asylum to Snowden. The whistle-blower’s plight is similar to that of WikiLeaks founder, Julian Assange, who has taken refuge in the Ecuadorian Embassy in London since June 2012. On July 20, less than a month after the beginning of the Snowden affair, Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro took the opportunity to end conversations that had begun in June with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry, stating, “My policy is zero tolerance to gringo aggression against Venezuela.” Talks to replace a U.S. ambassador in Caracas were abandoned yet again. In Latin America, ALBA countries act as an axis of anti-American sentiment. In February 2013, the Ecuadoran Foreign Minister Ricardo Patiño called the OAS Inter-American Defense Board “useless,” suggesting that it was merely another arm of U.S. influence in the region. A month later, Ecuadoran President Rafael Correa stated in the inaugural address of the 22nd Summit of ALBA that its members “must create a shield against exploitation, a shield against neocolonialism.” ALBA nations have established their own School of Sovereignty and Defense in Bolivia to keep U.S. imperialist intervention at bay. A main security argument is that drug trafficking is a problem for the United States and not necessarily a policy issue for South American countries. Action Not Following Rhetoric It would follow that the strong, constant flows of trade, aid, and security cooperation between Latin America and the United States would dry up after so much tension. Nevertheless, the U.S. Census Bureau reports that trade remains stable for now, especially for oil producers like Venezuela and Bolivia. Anti-American sentiment in the region seems to be purely rhetorical, having little impact on trade relations with the United States. Anti-American rhetoric in ALBA countries has not prevented them from listing the United States among their main trade partners. As of 2012, the United States was the main import source for Venezuela, Nicaragua, Ecuador, and Honduras. Particularly striking is that 31.2 percent of Venezuela’s imports and 28 percent of Ecuador’s come from the United States. Adding to this list, the United States is Bolivia’s fourth largest source of imports, producing up to 10 percent of its imports, and Argentina’s second source after Brazil. The United States receives the largest percentage of Latin American exports from Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. In the case of Bolivia, it drops to second place after Brazil. Such significant flows of merchandise and capital will not stop overnight, no matter how many countries forced the Bolivian presidential plane to land for a few hours. Changes in U.S. Demographically and economically, the United States is changing in ways that make any standoff with Latin American partners unlikely. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean’s recent report on foreign investment in the region, the United States still accounts for 58.5 percent of foreign investment. At the same time, the 53 million people of Hispanic and Latino origin in the United States account for 17 percent of its population, making them the largest ethnic minority in the country. In much the same way, as reported by The New York Times, Latin American migration to the United States has reached equilibrium with new arrivals roughly equivalent to the number of people returning home. Americans are also picking countries as diverse as Mexico, Belize, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua to retire to, while recent trips to Mexico and Chile by the U.S. president and vice president emphasize education exchanges. South America expresses its outrage through diplomacy. Consider, after Morales was allowed to return to La Paz, the diplomatic rumble escalated as members of the regional trading institution Mercosur called back their ambassadors in the countries that had denied the Bolivian president use of airspace. Ecuador joined them four days later, at which point Venezuela also officially removed ambassadors in Spain, France, Portugal, and Italy. An apology was issued July 25, and ambassadors from Bolivia, Venezuela, and Ecuador were reinstated to their offices in Paris, Rome, Madrid, and Lisbon two days later. Concerns may run more deeply over reports of the United States monitoring communications of presidents and strategic industries. Brazil is the world’s sixth largest economy, and Rousseff may use the embarrassing disclosures to leverage the United States on trade, Internet regulation, and other priorities. With the FIFA World Cup and the Olympics coming up, Brazil will most likely use the situation as much-needed political capital at home, instead of attempting any change in relations with the United States beyond venting at the U.N. Rousseff cannot afford to risk an international snafu amid growing discontent over her actions concerning domestic policy. Trade overrides ideology. Bottom line, left-wing leaders like Maduro and Morales need U.S. business in their economies, and the most vehement anti-imperialist talk is **overshadowed by economic pragmatism**. Ecuador is in an even more critical position, as reliance on the U.S. dollar in its economy means it cannot afford poor relations with the United States. Ideological hot air may grab headlines, but **will not trump** Latin America’s heavy flows of trade with the world´s most powerful economy.

#### No uniqueness -- Iran appeasement.

Schwartz 11/25, Sharona, 2013, “There Are A Lot Of People Comparing Obama’s New Iran Deal With A Significant (And Very Bad) Moment In History,” http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2013/11/25/there-are-a-lot-people-comparing-obamas-new-iran-deal-with-a-significant-and-very-bad-moment-in-history/)//DR. H

Both Israeli lawmakers and conservative pundits have compared the deal over Iran’s nuclear program secured in Geneva this weekend with the Munich Agreement of 1938 in which European nations agreed to allow Nazi Germany to annex parts of Czechoslovakia. Of the deal, then British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain declared his infamous phrase, “Peace for our time.” A year later, Adolf Hitler invaded Poland, revealing the folly of Chamberlain and his allies’ appeasement policy.

“Winds of Munich are blowing from Geneva,” Israeli Tourism Minister Uzi Landau told the Jerusalem Post. Right-wing Member of Knesset Moshe Feiglin wrote, “The Iranian version of the Munich Agreement was just signed in Geneva. Like Czechoslovakia in 1938, which was not party to the Western powers’’ discussions that effectively brought about its demise,, Israel today watches from the sidelines as its existential interest is being sacrificed by the West.”

Member of Knesset Ayelet Shaked said, “As Chamberlain said: Everything would have been alright if Hitler hadn’t lied to me.”

Besides the Israeli politicians, an array of conservative American voices has been invoking the words “Munich,” “appeasement” and “Chamberlain” as analogies for the Obama administration’s quest for a deal with Iran, while bloggers have been posting side-by-side photos of the Geneva and Munich meetings and photo-shopped images of Obama and Chamberlain.

“Nothing good happens late at night, and America just had a modern-day Neville Chamberlain moment,” former Congressman Allen West wrote.

“President Obama has just empowered the number one state sponsor of terrorism, Iran, to pursue its nuclear goals and objectives,” West added. “This is not diplomacy, this is abject surrender and appeasement. Iran loses nothing, not a single facility, not any capability to enrich uranium, but we have conceded the one best non-military option: economic sanctions.”

#### Both case studies and quantitative studies disprove your shenanigans.

Huth97Paul, Autumn. Director of Research at CIDCM as well as a professor in the Government and Politics Department at the University of Maryland. “Reputations and Deterrence: a Theoretical and Empirical Assessment,” Security Studies 7.1.

THE NUMBER of studies which have either focused on reputations as an explanatory variable, or treated reputations as one of several causal variables in tests of deterrence theory, is limited. These studies have employed both comparative case-study methods as well as statistical analyses of larger datasets, and the predominant focus has been on reputations for resolve as opposed to reputations for military strength. 20 A number of conclusions can be drawn from these studies: 1) Lack of Support for Schelling. There is weak support for the strong interdependence-of-commitments argument that potential attackers infer reputations for defender states based on the latter's prior behavior in disputes with other states across a broad range of geographic locations. Huth and Russett in their statistical analysis of fifty-four cases of extended deterrence from 1900 to 1980, found that the past behavior of the defender in disputes with other states had no significant impact on deterrence outcomes. 21 Mercer, in his analysis of the Moroccan Crises of 1905 and 1911 as well as the Bosnia-Herzegovina Crisis of 1908—9 did not find a clear or consistent pattern of European leaders inferring reputations from previous crisis outcomes. 22 Ted Hopf, in his study of U.S. foreign policy victories and defeats in the Third World from 1965 to 1990, concluded that Soviet assessments of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrent commitments in Europe and Asia were essentially unaffected by U.S. behavior in the Third World.

#### Anarchy makes the formation of reputation or credibility impossible --- pursuit of it only provokes more conflict.

Shiping Tang, Jan-March 05. Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Center for Regional Security Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing, Co-director of the Sino-American Security Dialogue. “Reputation, Cult of Reputation, and International Conflict,” Security Studies 14.1.

This article goes further than Mercer and argues that reputation cannot form in conflicts because of the anarchical nature of international politics. Because of its simplicity, parsimony, explanatory power, and better fit with empirical findings, this explanation is superior to Mercer’s. Anarchy remains the defining feature of international politics, so states operate within an environment of uncertainty. Anarchy produces “a strong sense of peril and doom” 62 and “a conservative tendency to think of the future in the worst possible or worst plausible cause terms.”63 States have to consistently assume the worst possible scenario, especially when they are engaged in conflicts.64 This “worst-case mentality” has major implications for reputation under anarchy on at least two fronts.65 Foremost, because a state’s security ultimately depends on self-help, the worst-case mentality means that a state has to assume its adversaries to be resolute and its allies to be irresolute. Essentially, **this worst-case assumption sets a baseline image for both adversaries and allies, and** **reputation becomes impossible**